a b s t r a c t I argue that psychology and epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, which have different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects. I support this claim by presenting a range of empirical evidence that religious cognitive attitudes tend to lack properties characteristic of factual belief, just as attitudes like hypothesis, fictional imagining, and assumption for the sake of argument generally lack such properties. Furthermore, religious credences have distinctive properties of their own. To summarize: factual beliefs (i) are practical setting independent, (ii) cognitively govern other attitudes, and (iii) are evidentially vulnerable. By way of contrast, religious credences (a) have perceived normative orientation, (b) are susceptible to free elaboration, and (c) are vulnerable to special authority. This theory provides a framework for future research in the epistemology and psychology of religious credence.
Introduction
Many philosophers and cognitive scientists have a habit of using the word ''belief'' as though it refers to one simple sort of cognitive attitude. And when we talk about differences in ''beliefs,'' we tend to focus on differences in contents, without considering the possibility that we are lumping distinct attitudes under this one word. But, I will argue, if we examine the matter carefully, we will soon find empirical reasons to think this habit is a source of confusion. Just as the word ''jade'' refers to two different substances 1 from the standpoint of modern chemistry, ''belief,'' we will see, refers to at least two different kinds of attitude from the standpoint of a well-developed, empirically-informed theory of cognitive attitudes.
2
Three interesting phenomena, broadly religious, help motivate this view.
Consider, first, Astuti's and Harris ' (2008: 734) description of the results of their experiments with the Vezo tribe in Madagascar, which focused on how the Vezo represent physical and psychological properties of the deceased:
Vezo do not believe in the existence and power of the ancestors in the abstract, but they believe in them when their attention is on tombs that have to be built, on dreams that have to be interpreted, and on illnesses that have to be explained and resolved. In other contexts, death is represented as total annihilation, and in these contexts it would be misleading to insist that Vezo believe in the existence of ancestral spirits. If they are right, then being in the ritual-religious setting toggles the Vezo mind toward using a special class of ''beliefs,'' a class that largely does not guide behavior outside the ritual-religious setting. If this is so, then different classes of ''belief'' representations have different functional properties. 
